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Pilcher during his tenure as a Police Legal Advisor fellow.

A workable, qualitative definition of the term
"field interrogation" is almost impossible to
devise. We will have to be content, then, with a
descriptive definition. For the purposes of this
article, a field interrogation is any situation in
which a police officer asks questions, pertaining to a
crime or a suspected crime, of a citizen prior to the
time when the citizen is taken, by force or consent,
to a police station for further processing. The
terms "field stop" and "field contact" are to be
considered as synonymous with the term "field
interrogation".
It would seem, at first glance, that the term
"field interrogation" should be susceptible of a
fairly accurate definition. But first glances can be
deceptive. There are several revealing and important reasons why any definition of the term "field
interrogation" must be, at least in some degree,
arbitrary.
The necessity to be arbitrary in the definition of
the term "field interrogation" arises primarily
because there are so few clear-cut cases where the
practice of field interrogation has been examined,
analyzed, or defined.' At the root of this definitional
problem is the wide disparity between the criminal
law, as developed by appellate courts, and police
practice. To the police officer, an arrest and a2
field interrogation are entirely distinct concepts.
Each has its own purpose, and the techniques used
in the streets are quite different. Generally, from
the policeman's standpoint, he "arrests" a person
when he takes this person to the police station to
be charged with a specific crime. On the other
hand, he is engaged in the practice of "field
interrogation" when he "checks out" a person to
determine who he is, what he has been doing, and
131 BIR LvN. L. R:Ev. 175 (1964).
2 BRisTow, FIELD INTERROGATION 5-6

(2d ed. 1964).

attempts to obtain an explanation of his actions.
Our appellate courts apparently have not made
this distinction until very recently. Instead, the
courts, when they have faced the real issues at all,
have talked in terms of "arrest".
Once the term "arrest" is used by an appellate
court it is immediately handicapped. In the first
place, the traditional concept of arrest is encrusted
with the barnacles of an ancient time which has
long since passed. Our present concept of arrest
was fairly accurately described by Matthew Hale
before 1676. 3 In feudal England, law enforcement,
or at least the bringing of an accused person before
a magistrate, was the responsibility of the people
in the community and the citizens were organized
in groups of hundreds in order to apprehend the
perpetrator of a crime. In theory, when a crime
was perpetrated and the person suspected of committing the crime was attempting to evade capture,
the general populace was supposed to evoke a
"hue and cry" to pursue the criminal in much the
same manner that the posse operates in a western
movie.
Such a system of apprehending criminals apparently worked satisfactorily in a static, rural
society where each person in the community was
intimately acquainted with every other person.
The system described above eventually evolved
into the Justice of the Peace system wherein the
Justice of the Peace was not only a magistrate but
also had the responsibility of preserving the peace
within his jurisdiction and was the chief law
enforcement officer. But the Justice of the Peace
system proved inadequate in the face of urbanization and a marked increase in criminal activity.4
3Detention, Arrest and Salt Lake City Police Practice,
9 UTAHt L. Rx'. 593 (19651.
4Td.
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As cities began to develop, a system of night
watchmen was evolved. The actual authority of
the night watchman is somewhat vague, but
apparently his only function was to take into
custody persons who were suspicious or who were
committing a crime and hold such persons until
dawn, when they could be handed over to the
regular law enforcement apparatus. 5 At the same
time there developed in England a system of
rewards and pardons to encourage citizens to apprehend criminals and bring them before a judicial
officer for the criminal process to commence. The
first organized police force in the Anglo-American
heritage was not established until 1829 when the
London metropolitan police force was created by
act of Parliament over vigorous opposition. Thus,
as one writer states:
... the law of arrest was developed in the

context of a citizen enforcement system where
arrests were often motivated by greed for
"blood money", private vendetta, or hope of
6
pardon for the arresting person's own crime.
The development of arrest law was probably
also influenced by the post arrest predicament
of the arrested person in early England. Persons charged with serious offenses were rarely
admitted to bail and conditions in the jails of
the time were horrible. Jails were run as a
private business and fees were charged for the
most elementary "privileges". Those persons
arrested who did not have the means to purchase better accommodations were huddled together, often in irons, in dark, filthy, rooms
and in close proximity to depravity and
disease. Under such conditions, an arrest
could be, and often was, equivalent to a death
sentence.'
The concept of the individual citizen as a law
enforcer is not merely of interest to medieval
scholars; it is very much alive in some parts of the
United States today. For example, the State of
Texas completely revised its Code of Criminal
Procedure in 1965, and this "modern" code provided the individual citizen with exactly the same
authority to make arrests without warrant as the
5 Kuh, Reflections On New York's "Stop and Frisk"

Law And Its Claimed Unconstitutionality, 56 J. CRis.

L., C. & P.S. 32 (1964).
6 UTAH L. REV., supra n. 3, at 595.
7
Id.
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authority granted to the peace officer, with one
exception.8
It is part of our judicial heritage that courts do
not determine abstract questions of law. Therefore, field interrogation situations which are
decided by courts usually are cast in the context
of a situation where the field interrogation has in
fact played a part in an arrest, a subsequent
charge, and a trial. Furthermore, the discussion
of field interrogation practices then arises under a
motion to suppress, an objection to the introduction of evidence, or a discussion of the existence or
nonexistence of probable cause to make the arrest.9
Unfortunately, at least at the trial court level, the
prosecutor is usually faced with meeting the
defense attorney on these grounds and attempting
to convince the court that: (a) probable cause for
an arrest did exist, or (b) the evidence in issue was
obtained prior to the time that an arrest occurred.
The crucial questions in field interrogation suffer
from being presented in this light.
In the first place, in most field contacts, probable
cause, in a classic sense, does not exist. The
traditional elements of probable cause are (1) that
the peace officer knows a specific crime has been
committed and (2) that the peace officer has
probable cause to believe that a specific individual
has committed the specific crime.' 0 If these
elements are present, then the officer would more
than likely simply arrest the individual, charge
him, and there would be no field interrogation
problem. As a result, the line is usually drawn on
the rather artful definition of what is an arrest; the
defense attorney naturally insists that the arrest
occurred at the very instant the person was stopped
and the prosecution insists with equal vigor that
the arrest occurred at some nonspecific time after
the individual was approached by the peace
officer. With very few exceptions the courts tend to
fall into this definitional trap. Therefore, we have
numerous courts which hold that the slightest
interference with a person's freedom of movement
8
TEx. ANN. CODE OF CRIm. PRoc. Ch. 14(1965).
This exception provided that peace officers could only
make arrests for felonies which did not occur in their
presence if (a) the peace officer were informed by a
credible person that an individual committed a felony,
(b) that the person so accused was attempting to
escape, and (c) that there is no time to procure a warrant. See Art. 14.04.

1 LaFave, Detention For Investigation By The Police:
An Analysis Of Current Practice, 1962 WAsH. U. L.
Q. 360.
106 C.J.S. Arrest, §6G(2) 587.
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is an "'arrest"," and a large number of other
decisions which define an arrest as "the taking into
custody a person so that he may answer for a
crime." 1- Thus, the critical issues involved in the
practice of field interrogation are obscured by the
semantic battle over the definition of "arrest".
Neither of these definitions reaches the essential
issues which are involved in the field interrogation.
Each of these definitions tends to beg the question,
and a court's decision automatically follows from
its choice of definition. To say that a peace officer
must have probable cause to make an arrest at the
very first instant where a citizen's full freedom of
locomotion is impeded in any way can lead to some
fantastic results. For example: let us assume that
an officer is informed that a person has just been
killed in a particular room in a particular building.
The officer rushes in and finds it full of people.
Most people would be willing to concede, at this
point, that the officer has probable cause to believe
that a crime has been committed; however, he has
absolutely no idea that any specific person in this
room has committed the crime. It would follow
then that the officer must stand there totally
helpless while the people in the room with the
dead body silently file out, leaving eventually no
one left but one confused and frustrated police
officer and one dead body.
On the other hand, the definition of arrest as the
taking of a person into custody to answer for a
crime can lead to some equally fantastic results.
This latter definition, if applied logically, would
authorize an officer to take people into custody and
theoretically detain them for an unknown length
of time. There would be no arrest unless the
officer's purpose in taking the individual was to
charge him with a crime. The odious "dragnet"
fits very comfortably in this latter definition." In
addition, this latter definition of arrest makes the
determination of whether or not an arrest has
occurred resolve around the subjective intent of a
police officer. It is submitted that the officer's
subjective intent is not a particularly desirable
point at which to determine such a crucial question
of an arrest, even when it is mitigated by the
general rule that the officer's intent can be determined from extraneous evidence and is not de-

pendent solely upon his word as to what was his
intent.
It is the author's suggestion that the very critical question involving individual liberties and
protection of society against crime are not served
by leaning on artificial and obscure definitions.
Another reason for the lack of legislative and
judicial attention to the question of field interrogation is the simple fact that such attention was
irrelevant in the many jurisdictions which did not
have an exclusionary rule, and where a person who
was unlawfully detained or arrested had no remedy
other than a theoretical cause of action against the
arresting officer for false arrest or false imprisonment. However, recent decisions by the Supreme
Court of the United States, especially in the cases
of Mapp v. Ohio,"4 M airnda v. Arizona,15 and TTWong
6
Sun -e. United Slates"
have made the initial contact
between the police officer and the citizen not only
relevant, but in many situations critical.
Prior to any further discussions relating to
field interrogation it is necessar - that we examine
the Constitution of the United States with relation
to the right of an individual to be free from arrest.
After all, if the Constitution requires that no
individual can be detained in any manner unless
the officer has classic probable cause to make an
arrest without a warrant, then any future discussion of balancing of public interest with individual
rights is irrelevant. The Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
It seems clear that the framers of this particular
amendment did not have in mind arrest and
searches as we think of them today. Historically,
the framers of the Constitution placed the Fourth
Amendment in the Bill of Rights to prohibit
general warrants and writs of assistance." The
writs of assistance were widely used and abused in
the thirteen colonies. They were writs which

14 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"1Barrett, Police Practices And The Law-From
15384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Arrest To Release Or Charge, 50 CAL. L. REv. 32 (1962).
16 371 U. S. 471 (1963).
12Perkins, The Law Of Arrest, 25 IowA L. R1v. 201
17 Leagre, The Fourth Amendment And The Law Of
(1940).
13 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1186 (1952).
Arrest, 54 J. CIMu. L., C.& P.S. 393, 396-397 (1963).
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authorized the officers to search anywhere at
anytime for contraband. Furthermore, these writs
were for an indefinite period of time, usually for the
life of the sovereign who was then reigning. 8 At
one point in the drafting of the Fourth Amendment it only contained the latter portion, which
spoke specifically of warrants. The insertion of the
first part of the amendment against "unreasonable
searches and seizures" probably was not intended
to impose additional standards, but to serve
merely as a preface to the prohibition of general
warrants. 9 However, there seems little doubt that
the Supreme Court has, and probably correctly so,
given life and meaning to the first portion of the
Fourth Amendment by interpreting the amendment to carry an overriding requirement of
"reasonableness" to the entire field.20
In the process of imposing this penumbra of
reasonableness to searches and seizures the Court
has also emasculated the rather simplistic argument that the Constitution prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures; that a reasonable
search is constitutional. This type of argument is
invalid, or more accurately a simple truism, because it overlooks the fact that "unreasonable" as
applied to searches and seizures is a word of art and
has, over the decades, obtained a specific legal
meaning over and above the meaning as applied in
general usage.
It should be noted at this point that the Fourth
Amendment does not use the word "arrest" at all.
Instead it uses the word "seizure" which is, in
effect, much broader than the word "arrest". Few
people would argue that no person could ever be
"seized" in the sense of being detained unless
"probable cause" existed. We have many examples
of this outside of the criminal field. A quarantine to
protect the community from contagious disease,"
the picking up of a lost child on the streets, the
detention of a person who is entering the United
States from a foreign country or the restraint of a
person who is attempting to commit suicide are all
examples of detentions which are "reasonable" but
which do not involve an arrest."
One may well wonder how the whole concept of
"probable cause" arose to apply to situations where
an officer stops a person on the street for the purpose of investigating a crime. Apparently, the
18Id. at 397.
'9 Id. at 397-398.
20Id. at

399.

The Law Of Arrest, 24 Tzx. L. Rav. 279
(1946).
22 Leagre, supra n. 17, at 406-407.
2Waite,
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rationale runs something like this: (1) the Fourth
Amendment states that no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause particularly describing the
person to be seized; (2) this applies to warrants of
arrest as well as search warrants; and (3) obviously the standard required to arrest a person
without a warrant must be at least as high as the
standard required to arrest a person with a warrant.
Thus we have reached the rather ironic situation in
which a constitutional provisiqn which was originally designed to prohibit governmental authorities from ransacking houses and personal effects
anytime they wanted to has now been interpreted,
by some persons at least, to also prohibit police
officers from stopping an individual who, at 2: 00 in
the morning, breaks and runs at the first sight of a
patrol car.
ARREST VERsus DETENTION

At this point we will deepen our inquiry and ask
some of the more fundamental questions which
arise when a police officer stops a citizen on the
street. Basically, the issues boil down to the following questions: Is there any significant difference between a detention and an arrest? If there
are valid distinctions, are there sufficient policy
reasons to recognize and authorize the police to
draw their own distinctions between detention and
arrest?
First, let us ask ourselves just what happens to a
person who is placed under "arrest", regardless of
exactly how the word is defined or exactly when
the arrest occurs. Let us assume that a person is
walking down a street in a city and a peace officer,
with more than adequate probable cause, approaches and places him under arrest. The individual is very probably searched on the spot, and then
taken to a police station where he is booked on
some charge. He may be interrogated at this
point if he waives his right to counsel, as required
by Miranda v. Arizona, and even if he is not interrogated, he is placed in jail unless he makes bond.
He is given the opportunity to have a preliminary
hearing to determine whether or not there is
"probable cause" to hold him pending indictment
or other procedure to bring him to trial. If such
probable cause exists, he either remains in jail, or
out on bond, until he is tried by a judge or a jury.
At this point he is found guilty or innocent of the
crime as charged and he is either released or retaken into custody. Let us further assume that
this particular individual is not guilty of the crime
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with which he is charged and he is released after a
not guilty finding by the trier of fact.
On the other hand, let us take a situation where
a person is "detained". In this circumstance he is
stopped on the street, usually asked to identify
himself and give some explanation of what he has
been doing and his movements in the neighborhood. He may even be required to stand by while
the officer investigating or detaining him checks
with the police station to see if he is wanted. There
might possibly even be a further detention while
witnesses to a crime attempt to identify him. If the
individual is under suspicion of committing a
major crime and he has an alibi he might even be
taken to the police station and held there until his
alibi can be checked. Under many circumstances he
will probably be searched to a greater or lesser
extent. We will assume once again that the individual is innocent of the crime, if any, of which he is
suspected and that he is released from his detention.
It cannot be too strongly emphasized at this
point that we are not discussing the detention of a
person that a police officer picks up at random. In
all cases relating to field interrogation or detention
we are assuming that the police officer has certain
facts which draw his attention to the individual
being detained or interrogated in the field, but
these facts fall short of classic probable cause to
make an arrest. The author knows of no responsible authority who advocates authorizing police
officers to pick a citizen at random off the street,
detain him, interrogate him or confine him in any
way unless there were some circumstances which
set this particular individual apart from the general public.
In order to make this latter point especially clear,
perhaps it would be best to outline the type of
situation which the author is speaking about when
he uses the word detention. A good example
occurred while the author was serving as Police
Legal Advisor to the Police Department of the City
of Corpus Christi, Texas and was one in which he
specifically suggested that the officers detain a
person without making an arrest. The circumstances of the detention were as follows: At 1:00
A. M., an individual knocked on the door of a
citizen and asked if this particular citizen could
spare a bandage. The person who knocked on the
door was bleeding rather profusely from a cut of
unknown origin on his hand. The homeowner,
who was a city official, called the police and re-

ported the incident while his wife obtained a
bandage for the injured person. When a patrol car
approached the house, two persons, not counting
the injured party, were sitting out in front in an
automobile. As soon as the patrol car came into
view, the two individuals, both young males, drove
off at a high rate of speed. They got approximately
three-fourths of a block when they were stopped by
another patrol car coming from the other direction.
The type of clothing worn by these three young men
and the type of car they were driving rather
clearly indicated that they did not live in the
neighborhood in which they were found. When
questioned separately, the individuals gave at
least two names to the police officers and came up
with three conflicting stories as to what they were
doing at this particular place and at this particular
time of night. None of the persons would give any
information as to how the injured individual cut
his hand. All three of the persons were held on the
street for approximately 30 minutes while the
police officers checked with headquarters to
determine whether or not any crime, such as
burglary, had occurred that night to the knowledge
of the police department in which a person suffered a cut on the hand. While this check was being
conducted, another patrol car examined two
nearby schools which were the source of frequent
cases of burglary or vandalism. Neither the check
by the patrol car nor the check through headquarters indicated that these particular people had
been involved in any specific crime. The young
men were permitted to leave after they had
identified themselves finally to the satisfaction of
the patrolmen and after the injured party had been
given first aid. It should be noted that all three of
these individuals were distinctly held against
their will, although no force was necessary, and it
should be further noted that the officers at the
scene had no "probable cause" to make an arrest
for a specific crime.
This type of detention apparently meets the
approval of a rather significant majority of commentators. A relatively recent article states:
"The stop, contrasted with an arrest, is relatively short, less conspicuous, and less humiliating to the person stopped and offers
much less chance for police coercion. Moreover the attempts to apply a single standard
of probable cause to all interferences is likely
to lead to a standard either so diluted that the
individual is not adequately protected or so
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strict that much apparently reasonable police
investigation is unlawful.n
Professor Wayne R. La Fave has asked a
number of extremely pertinent questions relating
to field interrogations. He asks whether it makes
any difference that the field interrogation typically
results in a much shorter period of detention than
an actual arrest. Does it make any difference that
the suspect will not have an arrest record, or that
the suspect will not consider himself under arrest?
He also inquires whether or not the person subjected to field interrogation has suffered as much
damage to his reputation as an actual arrest. He
apparently concludes that there is a good deal of
difference between a detention and an arrest and
he observes, "A conversation with a policeman on
the street corner is not likely to be mistaken by the
public as an arrest as is the actual taking of the
suspect to the station for further questioning. 24
Another writer has observed that "The London
Police, who have been proclaimed as models for
American police agencies, have been stopping
several hundred thousand people a year and asking to see the contents of bags they are carrying or
inquiring as to the possession of other property
which might have been stolen. " 25
Still another author goes to the extreme of
postulating the proposition that a policeman's
authority to conduct a field interrogation is in
reality an exercise of the detained individual's
affirmative right to be given an opportunity to be
heard before he is arrested.2 6 Presumably this
"right" is based on some sort of free speech rationale rather than on the more familiar right to remain
silent as contained in the Fifth Amendment.
Even among the writers who belittle the distinction between arrest and detention there is
usually a concession that there is a difference in (a)
the limitation on the length of a detention, (b) the
lack of an arrest record, and (c) the fact that the
detained person can truthfully answer "no" if
asked if he has ever been arrested. This latter
23Recent Statute, 78 HAzv. L. Ruv. 473, 474-75
(1964).
24
LaFave, supra n. 9, at 364.
2

5 Ronayne, The Right To Investigate And New York's
"Stop And Frisk Law", 33 FoRDHAms
L. REV. 211, 214

(1964).
26Perkins, supra n. 12, at 261.
27 For additional authorities which generally support
some type of field detention, see 37 MIcHI. L. Rxv. 311
(1938); The Law Of Arrest: ConstitutionalityOf Detention
And Frisk Acts, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 641 (1964); 28
VA. L. REV. 315 (1942); 14 SYRAcUSE L. REv. 505.
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element is becoming more and more important in
our society today when individuals must fill out all
types of forms, many of which ask questions relating to the person's "police record". However, the
suggestion that there is a valid distinction between
an arrest and a detention in fact, if not in law, does
not mean to imply that an interrogation, no
matter how short, by a police officer on the street
is totally innocuous. When a person is stopped on
the street and asked questions, by a police officer
there is undoubtedly a good deal of pressure on this
individual to respond to the police officer's questions. After all, what are a person's alternatives
when he is faced with the situation where he is the
subject of a field interrogation? In practice, he has
only five alternatives: (1) He can confess to a
crime, (2) he can offer his identification and give
plausible reasons for being present and give an
explanation of his recent movements, (3) he can
attempt to flee, (4) he can tell a lie, or (5) he can
refuse to answer any questions at all. To a thoughtful person a confession or flight are obviously out
of the question. This conduct will only tend to
confirm the police officer's original suspicion,
whatever that may have been, which caused the
officer to single the person out in the first place.
This, in effect, leaves a person only three alternatives: cooperate, refuse to answer any question,
or lie.
Regardless of the legal effect of a refusal to
answer, the practical effect of such a refusal will
be to confirm an officer's suspicion. A lie is dangerous because it can be used as a factor in probable
cause to make an arrest if it is detected and will, at
least, heighten the officer's suspicion. Thus, as a
practical matter, a person detained has no satisfactory alternative but to identify himself and
attempt to convince the police officer that he is an
upstanding citizen with nothing to fear from the
law.
By way of summary then, what are the distinctions between a detention and an arrest? First, the
detention or custody is limited. It is true that in
some rare instances field interrogation or field
detention will go beyond the few minutes which it
normally takes. However, even at it most extreme,
a field detention is likely not to take anywhere near
the time that a formal arrest will consume. We
must bear in mind that a traditional arrest usually
carries with it a processing period during which
the individual under arrest is fingerprinted, has
his picture taken and is usually interrogated unless
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he refuses to answer any questions. Of course,
almost every state requires that the individual be
released on bond or taken "immediately" before a
magistrate. But the bond procedure can consume
30 to 45 minutes, counting the time that the person
under arrest gets in touch with a bondsman and has
all of the papers signed.
Secondly, a person who is subjected to a field
detention and a field interrogation does not have on
his record, which will be with him for the rest of
his life, the fact that he has been charged with a
crime. In most states a person who is arrested, no
matter how capriciously, is still saddled with that
vague and indefinable thing which scares employers
away-a "police record". The individual has this
albatross hanging around his neck regardless of the
outcome of his trial--even though he may be
totally exonerated and even collect damages from
the peace officer who illegally arrested him. It is
true that some police departments maintain
informal or "nonofficial" records of field interrogations which they feel will be significant in the
future. But this is an entirely different process than
the maintenance of an official arrest record.
Thirdly, since a detained person has virtually no
idea that he has in fact been "arrested", in spite of
some courts' definitions, he can truthfully answer
"no" to the inevitable question, "Have you ever
been arrested or convicted of any crime other than
a traffic offense?"
Finally, we must consider the detained person's
reputation. It is almost inconceivable that a person
who has been the subject of a field interrogation
does any significant damage to his reputation when
his friends and neighbors see him talking to a police
officer on the street corner. Any damage to reputation under such circumstances is certainly far less
than the damage which might occur if these same
friends and neighbors saw the individual being
taken off, handcuffed, in the back seat of a police
car. This difference in damage to reputation is
particularly important if the crime under investigation is one involving extreme emotional reactions
from the neighborhood, such as child-molesting,
homosexual activity, or the like.
The fact that the actual distinction between an
arrest and a detention is a real distinction is a far
cry from saying that the distinction is significant
enough to treat the arrest differently from the
field interrogation in terms of public policy. One of
the most vigorous foes of field interrogation and

detention is Professor Caleb Foote.n Although he
laces his works with a great deal of emotionalism,
he nevertheless makes some points which can
hardly be ignored. He challenges, to begin with, the
necessity for any type of general detention statute
or practice which is separate from the traditional
law of arrest. And, as might be suspected, he
insists that arrest is "an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested",29 which occurs at the
moment an individual is no longer a free agent to
do as he pleases.
Professor Foote insists that we do not have
enough information to determine the necessity of
field interrogation. He states: "factual assumptions
made about police arrest practices today necessarily rest upon political philosophy or armchair
speculation seasoned with scattered and unreliable
statistics, isolated studies, personal experiences or
undocumented police claims." He is, of course,
correct that criminal law, especially as it involves
the work of the police officer on the street, has
-suffered and is still suffering from a gross lack of
concrete, reliable data. But the social sciences
cannot remain static because our methods of
information-gathering do not fit in the admirable
and convincing matrix which the physical sciences
have managed to develop.
Professor Foote argues that the need for field
interrogation and detention would disappear if we
have more and 'better trained police officers. He
states:
The chief disadvantages of these alternatives
are that they cost money and require the exercise of political and administrative statesmanship whereas enacting new arrest laws offers the
illusion of doing something about crime without financial or political complications and has
a natural appeal to political expediency. I
suspect that in police work, as elsewhere, one
generally gets no more than he pays for, and
that legislation of police power is a wholly
inadequate substitute for responsible police
fiscal and personnel policy.
The importance of seeking alternatives
within the present legal framework is emphasized when one examines the impact of police
arrest practices upon our'constitutional respect
for privacy. The right to be let alone--to be
28See Foote, The Fourth Amzendmzent: Obstacle Or
Necessity In The Law Of Arrest?, in PoLIcE PowER
A.N INDIvmDUAL FREEDOUr (Sowle ed. 1962).
21Id. at 30.
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able to sit in one's own house or drive one's
own car or walk the streets without unwarranted police intrusion-is surely one of the
most important factors to be weighed in
achieving a balance between individual liberty
and public necessity. Ironically, it is this factor
about which we know the least. Although we
are often inadequate, we collect at least some
data on the number of crimes reported, the
number of crimes cleared by arrest and the
mortality between charge and conviction. We
also have figures purporting to state the number of persons arrested but usually this only
reflects cases where the police have booked,
fingerprinted and charged the suspect. We
cannot even guess at the true arrest rate because we have no data on the number of people
whose liberty is restrained but who after
investigation are released without charge.
Under these circumstances to try to make an
intelligent evaluation of how the right of privacy iares under present conditions and how
proposed changes in the law would affect it is
very much like trying to compute batting
averages when one knows only the number of
hits for each player but has no data on the
30
number of times at bat.
Professor Foote sidesteps the problems of the
hypothetical emergency situation, such as the
right of the police to temporarily detain a person
found near a fresh corpse, by stating: "Whatever the law may be in such situations, the reasonableness of the police action is conditioned by an
immediate crisis and would have no general ap31
plication. Then he refers to Mr. Justice Jackson's
dissenting opinion in the case of Brinegar v.
United States,32 where the Justice appears to
approve of a situation in which police officers
might throw a roadblock around a neighborhood
and search every outgoing car when this is "the
only way to save a threatened life and detect a
vicious crime", whereas he would disapprove of
"a roadblock and universal search to salvage a
few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger."
The fact that Professor Foote himself draws a
distinction between emergency situations and
everyday police problems seems to be flatly
contradictory to his position that the Constitution
permits only one single standard of probable
30
Id. at 33.
-11 d.at 35.
338 U.S. 160 (1949).

[Vol. 58

cause. Once it is admitted that a police officer may
take certain steps in an "emergency" situation,
but that the officer may not take the same steps
in a "non-emergency" situation, it is obvious that
the authority of the police officer to arrest or
detain a person depends on the type, degree, or
even existence of an emergency. Therefore, the
whole scope of the inquiry ceases to be whether or
not the officer has the authority to detain a person,
but rather the essential questiQn is-under what
type of "emergency" circumstances may an
officer detain a person?
One engaged in library research in the field of
police detention is struck by the fact that there is
almost no dialogue between the persons who want
to strictly limit the policeman's authority to detain
a person and those advocates of broadening the
officer's authority to make a detention. There are
numerous articles, of course, but they are in effect
monologues which are, this author suspects,
largely directed at people who have already become
convinced. In other words, the scholarly debators
are simply not speaking the same language at all.3
Those authors who tend to advocate broadening
a policeman's authority to detain a person usually
stress the "practicalities" of on-the-spot police
work. They can point to numerous situations where
reasonableness and common sense would dictate
that a police officer make a detention, but where
the circumstances are such that the officer would
normally be beyond his authority in making such a
detention. These advocates usually fail to come to
grips with the legal and constitutional issues
which are involved in any exercise of authority by
a police officer in the field other than to say, perhaps, "well, the Constitution of the United States
only prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
and thereby permits searches and seizures which
are reasonable".
On the other hand, those individuals who advocate strictly limiting a police officer's power tend to
avoid concrete discussions of hypothetical, or even
real, situations where a police officer could be
expected to act "reasonably" and use good common sense. These advocates prefer instead to
discuss the legalistic issues involved and to become
enmeshed in esoteric discussions of "arrest" and
"probable cause".
What is too often overlooked is that no constitutional right, privilege or guarantee is absolute. The
-1 Compare 12 OKLA. L. REv. 154 (1959) with 12
L. REv. 160 (1959).
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whole idea of law, as a decisional process, is an attempt to apply certain principles to everyday life
t, the extent that they are meaningful and pliable.
The task of building Utopias is left to the philosoipher. The task of the working lawyer is to develop
certain principles and practices which will guarantee the maximum of public order and crime prevention and at the same time permit the maximum
of constitutional freedoms to the individual citizen.
Specific Issues
So far, the problem of field detention and interrogation have been discussed in somewhat general
terms. It would be useful, now, to examine some of
the more narrow and specific issues which will
arise in a field interrogation or detention situation.
USE OF FORCE

One of the issues which courts and legislatures
have been particularly reluctant to face is the
question of what force, if any, a police officer
should be authorized to use in a detention less than
an arrest. Neither the Uniform Arrest Act nor the
"Stop and Frisk" law of New York mention the
question of force. Very few courts have been
faced with this question, since experience seems to
show that only an infinitesimal group of people
attempt to resist a mere street stop. Furthermore,
it is this author's very firm suspicion, based on two
years' on-the-street work and observation with
police departments, that in those rare instances
where the police must use force in what would
ordinarily be a field detention situation, the officer
has a tendency to take the position that he approached the resisting individual initially for the
purpose of making an arrest, usually for some
vagrancy type offense.
However, the fact that the use of force in a
field detention situation is seldom dearly placed in
issue during the course of trial does not mean that
the question of force is not an important one to
which we should address our attention. About the
only legislative enactments, in the criminal law
area, which specifically deal with force are the
merchant detention statutes designed to combat
shoplifting. In addition, the provision of the American Law Institute's Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure, which has not been enacted by any
state, also dearly faces the issue of force in a field
interrogation or detention context. Both the ALl
code and the typical merchant detention statute
state that the person who is detaining or stopping

an individual may use all reasonable force short
of deadly force.
It is quite understandable why legislatures and
courts are loathe to face the issue of force. A field
detention, virtually by definition, is the stopping
of a person when there is no probable cause to believe the person who is the subject of the stop has
committed a crime. It seems rather extreme, therefore, to authorize a police officer to forcefully
wrestle with an individual and perhaps handcuff
him for the purpose of asking that individual his
name and address and what he has been doing.
Some writers evade the issue of force by stating
that all the police officer is doing is walking up and
asking a person a question in much the same way
a private individual would do. Therefore, the implication is that the police officer is doing no more
than any other individual could do, thus the
question of force, if not irrelevant, tends to fade
away. In other words, if A, a private citizen, stops
B on street and asks of him directions to the bus
station, it is quite possible that B would simply
continue on his way without answering at all. A
would probably classify B as an extremely rude
person; however, we simply do not consider the
question of how much force A may be permitted to
use against B in order to obtain an answer to his
question because force, in such a context, is simply
unthinkable. Therefore, to equate a police officer
with the private citizen in a field detention situation is to lose touch with reality.
The author has observed more than 400 field
stops in two different states and he has never seen
a situation where force has been necessary. It is
almost inconceivable that the type of questions
which were asked during these field stops, and some
of the questions were rather searching, would have
been tolerated by the detained person unless theywere being asked by a police officer. The only conclusion which can be drawn from these observations
is that the presence of a police officer, no matter
how pleasant his demeanor, implies the potential
use of force-force at least to effectuate the stop
if not to compel the answers.
Another method of evading the question of force
in a detention situation is to take the position that
any force used was, in fact, for some purpose other
than detaining an individual. An excellent example
of this technique is found in the case of High v.
State.3 In this case the police officers were informed
by a passing motorist that a disturbance was taking
217 S.W. 2d 774 (Tenn. 1949).
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place at a certain location. The officers rushed to
the location and saw a car driving away with one
person in it. They stopped the car and found that
the driver was intoxicated. There was apparently
no evidence, such as erratic driving, to indicate
that the driver was intoxicated prior to the time
he was stopped by the officers. The Supreme Court
of Tennessee upheld the conviction for driving
while intoxicated. It held that the stopping of the
automobile was not a technical arrest and that the
officers simply stopped the car for the purpose of
quelling the disturbance of which they had been
informed and found that the driver was intoxicated. The court rather unimaginatively overlooked the fact that there was no disturbance to
quell at the time the officers stopped the car and,
as a matter of fact, no disturbance ever took place
in the presence of the officers other, perhaps, than
the disturbance which may have occurred during
the course of taking the driver into custody for the
offense of driving while intoxicated.
The only case to face the issue of force squarely
is Cannon v. State.35 In this case the defendant
followed a woman to her house and accused her of
speeding while she had been driving an automobile.
The defendant was obviously drunk. Two officers
arrived and took the defendant, against his will,
to the police station for an intoxication test. He
apparently failed the test and was charged with
driving while intoxicated. It was the theory of the
state that he was not placed under arrest until after
he had failed his test for intoxication and that the
intervening detention was authorized by Delaware's version of the Uniform Arrest Act. The
defendant contended that the detention statute
did not authorize the use of force and contemplated
only voluntary detention. The Delaware Supreme
Court, without much discussion, rejected such a
contention out of hand. The court held that such a
construction of Delaware's detention statute would
make the statute meaningless.
It is obvious that the Delaware Supreme Court
in the Cannon case articulated the proper rule of
law. It is admittedly offensive to contemplate force
being used against a private citizen when the
private citizen is not being placed under arrest
based on probable cause. The necessity of force will
occur in extremely rare instances in the field detention context. But even so we should face the fact
that a field detention authorization must carry
with it the right of the officer to use force in making
35168 A. 2d 108 (Del. 1961).
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a detention. If such authorization is not present
then we have not given the officer the tool which
he needs to gain the maximum benefit from a field
detention and interrogation authority. Indeed, a
detention statute without the right to use force
may lead to a situation where the general public,
which has relatively little to fear with or from a
field detention statute, will be subjected to being
stopped and questioned, but the small corps of
criminals at whom the detention statute is primarily aimed, will have no reason to fear it since
they know they will not be required to pay any
attention to the officer when he approaches them.
This would lead to the further result that the general public would be limited in their freedom and
there would be no corresponding gain to society as
a whole.
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Another issue involved in a field detention and
interrogation is the question of the detainee's right
not to answer the questions on the basis that the
answers might incriminate him. There seems to be
absolutely no question that a person who is subjected to a field interrogation cannot be required
to answer questions of an incriminatory nature.
Any other interpretation of a statutory or common
law right of field detention would be squarely contrary to the Fifth Amendment's protection against
self-incrimination. However, there does seem to
be some question as to the effect of a person's refusal to answer the police officer's question. This
question is usually framed in the context of whether
or not the refusal to answer questions can be taken
into consideration as one of the factors or elements
in determining probable cause to make an arrest
for a specific offense.
It has been held that flight from an officer to
avoid answering questions can be a factor in determining probable cause. 6 By the same token, contradictory stories given in rapid succession, and
obvious lies can also be taken into consideration
in determining probable cause.37 Chief Justice
Traynor of the California Supreme Court stated,
as dictum, in the case of People v. Simon 1 that
"there is, of course, nothing unreasonable in an
officer's questioning persons outdoors at night
[citing authorities] and it is possible that in some
circumstances even a refusal to answer would, in
-1 See Scurlock, Arrest In Missouri, 29 U. K&N.
CITY L. REv. 117, 125 (1961).
37State v. Hedman, 130 N.W. 2d 628 (Minn. 1964).
290 P. 2d 531 (Cal. 1955).
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the light of other evidence, justify an arrest".
There are, of course, other authorities that do not
agree; they state that an exercise of a person's
privilege against self-incrimination cannot be used
as a factor in determining probable cause.
The only provision of the AL's Model Code of
Pre-Arraignment Procedure which was specifically
rejected was the provision which would permit a
failure to comply with an obligation imposed by
the code to be used in determining probable cause
for an arrest. It was the intention of the drafters, as
shown by the commentary accompanying the
draft, to permit the refusal to answer authorized
questions by police officers to be used as a factor
in determining probable cause.
States which have adopted the Uniform Arrest
Act provide that any person, questioned by an
officer, who fails to identify himself or explain his
actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be
detained further for a period of detention not to exceed two hours. The statutory wording seems to
indicate quite clearly that a refusal to answer the
officer's questions, even on the basis of a privilege
of self-incrimination, could result in the individual
being taken to the police station and held there
until he does answer the officer's questions or until
two hours expire. However, research does not reveal any case with that specific holding. In fact,
no cases from the states which have adopted the
Uniform Arrest Act have been found which even
discuss the effect of a failure to answer the officer's
questions.
There is authority for the proposition, of course,
that while the Constitution does not require a person to incriminate himself, the Constitution does
not state that the exercise of the privilege cannot
be used for any other purpose.39 Recent decisions
of the Supreme Court seem to indicate that the
purposes for which an invocation of the privilege
against self-incrimination are used have been
severely limited, although the court has not overruled the above stated principle in its entirety. '
Nevertheless, the court has been especially alert
and sensitive to any situation in which the use of
the privilege against self-incrimination could be
interpreted as an admission of guilt.4' It would
seem, therefore, that the use of the privilege against
21See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S.
232 (1957); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953)
and Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405 (1960).
40Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
41Slochower v. Board .350 U.S. 551 (1956).

self-incrimination in a context where a detained
person refuses to answer any of the officer's questions would fall in the "admission of guilt" category and be held to be constitutionally protected; in
other words, a. refusal to answer questions during
field interrogation cannot be used as a factor in
determining subsequent probable cause to make an
arrest.
Thus far we have been discussing a situation in
which a detained person refuses to answer any of
the police officer's questions, except perhaps for
name and address. A different conclusion might
be reached if a detained person answered most of
the officer's questions but refused to answer certain
questions relating to a specific subject. Under such
circumstances, if the officer considered refusal to
answer a portion of his questions in his determination of probable cause to make an arrest, his determination might be upheld. True, he would be
implying that the detainee was admitting guilt by
his refusal to answer certain questions and would
therefore be subject to the previously outlined
constitutional objections. On the other hand, such
conduct on the part of the detained individual
might come closer to the "contradictory or evasive
answer" category which has been recognized as a
factor in probable cause.
The field research did not disclose a single instance where a detained person absolutely refused
to answer any of the police officer's questions. On
those rather rare instances when answers were refused, the subject matter usually did not involve
probability of a crime, but rather third persons
whom the detainee preferred not to name. Most
instances of refusal occurred when the officer asked
the detainee where he had been and he replied that
he had been to see his girlfriend. When the officer
would inquire as to her name and address, presumably for the purpose of verification, the detained individual would refuse to answer, perhaps
out of chivalry or perhaps out of wisdom.
It is the author's opinion that an officer who has
so little probable cause to make an arrest that the
refusal of a person to answer his questions will
suing the decision one way or the other, in all
likelihood has a pretty weak arrest to begin with.
A reviewing court would probably find "insufficient
probable cause" without a detailed and careful
examination of the constitutional issues involved.
It is also the author's conclusion, based upon field
research, that a person who answers questions with
extreme reluctance almost invariably attracts the
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full attention of the questioning officer to the extent
that the officer starts attempting to find probable
cause to make an arrest. Even when probable cause
is not found, the person who answered the questions evasively or with extreme reluctance can almost certainly be assured that he will be under
some type of surveillance. The time and duration
of this surveillance will, of course, depend on
numerous circumstances. Therefore, even if a refusal to answer the officer's questions does not
constitute probable cause for an immediate arrest,
such refusal to answer is seldom to the detainee's
advantage.
LENGTH OF DETENTION

The length of a field detention is an issue of particularly vital importance. Various statutory enactments permit a detention for any period of time
ranging from twenty minutes, in the case of the
AL Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, to two
hours in the case of the Uniform Arrest Act.
Other statutes, such as New York's "Stop and
Frisk Act", and the common law right to field
detention, do not contain any specific time period
for the detention. Presumably cases falling in the
latter category could result in a detention for a
"reasonable" period of time.
In discussing the length of detention, the conflicting balance of values is rather obvious. On one
hand, it is quite obvious that a field detention is

especially capable of police abuse. In addition,
those persons who advocate a field detention of
some type stress the fact that the invasion of a
person's right to free mobility is so slight as to
justify the use of field detention as a law enforcement tool. On the other hand, if the length of
detention is made so short as to dilute the effectiveness of such a detention as a law enforcement aid,
then very little has been gained by authorizing
such detention.
One argument against having any specific period
of detention named at all is that any time limit set
by a statutory enactment will be considered by the
officer as the usual length of time which he can detain a person and, therefore, there will be a tendency for officers to detain persons for the maximum
period of time even when the use of this maximum
period of time is not necessary. This conduct on the
part of the police officer would, in the author's
opinion, be especially true in those cases where the
officer, by virtue of his experience and "street
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wisdom", feels intuitively that the individual he is
detaining has committed some crime, but the
officer just can't quite "pin anything on him". On
the other hand, the phrase "for a reasonable period
of time" can be interpreted many ways under certain circumstances. This might result in a field
detention statute being used as an excuse for a
general investigative custody for a number of
hours. Such a use would, of course, be contrary to
the general purpose of field interrogation statutes
which are primarily designed to authorize the police
officer to obtain the name, address and explanation
of actions from the individual who has been
stopped. Naturally there will be some cases where
the officer, using reasonableness and common sense,
will desire to detain a person for a more protracted
length of time pending a further investigation.
However, the field research done by the author,
coupled with his field experience, indicate that the
need for an extended detention is an extremely
rare event. This field research and subsequent experience, which will be described in some detail
hereafter, indicate that the vast majority of field
detentions consume less than six minutes. Indeed,
the only field detention observed by the author
which exceeded thirty minutes occurred in the
City of Chicago when the police department's
highly touted computer broke down and, as a result, an individual was detained for almost an hour
until the clerical staff at headquarters could determine whether or not the detained person was
wanted for an offense. He was.
Any detention statute should have a maximum
length of detention expressed therein and that
length of detention should be approximately thirty
minutes. Such a period of time would be sufficient
to cover the overwhelming majority of situations
in which a field detention would be desirable. In
addition, the existence of a thirty-minute time
limit would clearly indicate to the officer that the
statute is designed to permit only the most minor
of detentions and is not to be used as an excuse to
take a person into custody while an investigation
is in process. A thirty-minute time period would
also tend to cancel out those situations where the
individual police officer, for one reason or another,
decided to hold a detained person for the full time
alloted by the statute. Even where this abuse does
occur, a detention for a half-hour is a relatively
minor invasion of a person's general right to free
locomotion.
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three broad categories. The first is where a police
officer has some reason to believe that the detained
party has committed a crime. Perhaps the belief
is not of such a nature as to constitute probable
cause, but at least the officer has, prior to the stop,
a very specific situation or set of circumstances
about which he desires to question the detained
person. In the second, it is believed that the person
to be detained has done something, or his presence
is so out of character with the neighborhood, that
the officer desires a general ex'lanation regarding
the individual's movements. Finally, we have the
circumstance wherein a detained person may be a
witness to a crime or have information relating to a
specific crime which the peace officer feels would
be valuable. Of course, these three general categories of detentions are very broad and each category is capable of being broken down into an almost infinite variety of sub-categories.
There seems to be little doubt that no Miranda
warning would be required in the third class of
field interrogation involving a witness. This is the
type of interrogation in which there is no thought,
at least initially, that the detained person has
committed a crime or is guilty of any other unlawful conduct. Indeed, the Miranda case itself
excludes this type of questioning from the requirement of a warning. 3 The second category of field
interrogation would, at first glance, also seem to be
outside the scope of the Mliranda decision. After
all, there is no probable cause for an arrest and,
there is in fact no "custody" or arrest as those
terms have been used and interpreted by a majority
of the cases. Furthermore, the officer is usually not
concentrating his questions upon a specific crime
or circumstance but rather is asking the individual
for nothing more than his name, address and exSCOPE OF QUESTIONS
planation of his presence and actions.
Another issue involved in a field interrogation
We must remember, however, that the field stop,
situation relates to the types of questions which if properly used, is not a "random sampling" of
may be asked a detained person. This issue has persons in the community. Under court decisions
been created primarily as a result of the Supreme which validate the common law field interrogation
Court's decisions in the Escobedo' and Miranda and the stop and frisk tatutes, an officer is aucases.
thorized to make a stop only when an individual's
The Miranda case will be discussed at some
conduct raises a certain degree of suspicion in the
length hereafter to determine if it applies to a field
officer's mind that the person stopped has cominterrogation situation at all. However, assuming
mitted, is committing, or is about to commit a
that the Miranda case could apply to a field intercrime. Therefore, a person subjected to a field stop
rogation, the issue remains as to whether or not
is being investigated as a suspect for a crime even
Miranda would apply to every field interrogation.
nature of the crime may be unIt seems valid to classify field interrogation into though the exact
U.S. 436 at 477-78.
4384
- 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
ExcL-so.N.RY RULE

The vexing question always arises regarding
what remedy would be available if a person has
been detained beyond the thirty-minute maximum
time period advocated in this article. For example,
though no exclusionary rule governing violations
of the ALI twenty minute limitation has yet been
drafted, conceivably the drafters could take the
position that all evidence obtained during the stop
taken before the expiration of twenty
-that
minutes as well as that taken thereafter--should be
excluded because the stop, considered as a whole,
was illegal. This would be, to say the least, a most
unfortunate and, indeed, unfair rule. We would
then have a situation where the search of a person,
which almost always occurs very early in the stop,
would result in the discovery of legally admissible
evidence, but if the detained person gave a prolonged explanation regarding his conduct or his
possession of the contraband, then this evidence,
which was originally valid and admissible, would,
at the 21st minute of detention, suddenly become
inadmissible. Such a "now you see it, now you
don't" rule of exclusion is unnecessary, impractical,
and logically inconsistent. An exclusionary rule
which covered only those items discovered as a
result of a search after the maximum period of
detention had elapsed might be acceptable, but
evidence obtained as the result of the search during
the permissible time period should be admissible,
regardless of subsequent circumstances. If the
officer exceeds the period of detention, such violations of the statute can more effectively be dealt
with by use of other disciplinary techniques which
will be subsequently discussed.
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known to the officer at the time of the stop. True,
the detained individual is not the "focus of suspicion" that be would be if the officer had extraneous evidence to the fact that the detained person
had committed a specific crime, but this does not
remove the fact that the detained person is suspected of doing something illegal. Nevertheless,
the author believes that the Escobedo and Miranda
cases would not apply to this second category of
field detention. Escobedo and the four cases decided
in Miranda all involved circumstances where individuals were very clearly under arrest and had
been in fact taken to places of detention. The interrogators in those cases employed techniques
which were designed to obtain confessions from
the individual involved to be used in evidence
against him in a specific case which was under investigation. The field interrogation, on the other
hand, is not designed so much to obtain a confession of a specific crime as it is to determine or
obtain information relating to the detained person's conduct. As long as the interrogation officer
confines himself to such questions as "what are you
doing out here at this time of the morning?",
there is little likelihood that he would be required
to give the Miranda warning at this first approach
to the individual to be detained.
The first category of field stop, that of questioning a person with relation to his guilt concerning
a specific crime or series of crimes, is an entirely
different matter. Here we have a situation where
the "'focus of suspicion" is relatively firm and it
would appear that if Miranda applies to questioning away from the stationhouse at all, it would
apply in this type of circumstance. Hence, the
officer would be required to give the Miranda
warning if he wanted to use the individual's statements as evidence against the individual in a
criminal case. In addition, we can predict with a
relatively high degree of accuracy that the Supreme
Court is going to be rather sensitive to investigative
techniques which can be reasonably construed as
designed to evade the Miranda decision. Approaching a person whom a police officer believes has
committed a specific crime and interrogating him
with relation to that specific crime on a street
corner under the disguise of a field stop might very
easily be interpreted as such an evasion.
In summation, no warnings are necessary under
the Miranda decision to persons who have been
subjected to a field stop except in those cases
where the interrogation relates to a specific crime
which an officer has probable cause to believe, or
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at least suspects, that the detained person has
committed.
RECORDS OF THE STOP

Another issue involved in field stops is whether
the police ought to record the detention. This
issue probably has an emotional content which
far exceeds its true importance. The New York
"Stop and Frisk" Act, as well as the Uniform Arrest Act, are quite specific in- stating that field
detentions should not be recorded as arrests in
any official police record. On the other hand, the
Al Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
requires each field stop to be recorded and sets
forth in some detail the information to be kept.
The importance of record keeping insofar as the
general public is concerned is perhaps exemplified
by a public controversy which broke out in the City
of Chicago in the winter of 1965-66. That police
department's policy is to conduct field stops even
though Illinois has no enabling legislation and the
Illinois courts have not clearly sustained a peace
officer's common law authority to make field
detentions. In spite of the fundamental issues
which surround field interrogations, the opponents of such a departmental policy opposed most
vigorously the Chicago police department's practice of making notations of field stops and then
retaining them for a thirty-day period. If newspaper support is any indication of general public
approval, it would appear that the people of Chicago approve the practice of field stops even in
spite of their alleged "illegality""; nevertheless,
even the newspapers which generally supported
the policy of a field interrogation expressed dis4
comfort over the record-keeping practice.
Those states which prohibit the keeping of
records of field stops do so, presumably, in an
attempt to make the consequences of such a stop
as innocuous as possible. In fact, as indicated
earlier, the lack of a detained person's "police
record" as the result of the stop is one of the primary points which distinguishes a field interrogation from an arrest. A good deal of public
sentiment can be aroused by charging that police
departments are compiling dossiers on individuals
to be used for some vague, future and unknown
(but presumably sinister) purpose.
Police officials, on the other hand, support the
idea of keeping records which are to be main4Chicago
Sun-Times, January 19, 1966, at 31.
45
.Id.
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tained for a limited period of time on a number
of grounds. First, such records provide leads if it
should be later determined that a crime was
committed in a certain neighborhood. The theory
is that the investigating officers would check the
field stop records to find out which suspiciously
acting persons were in the general area of the crime
at the time it was committed. Police officers,
especially administrators and supervisors, can
also use the field interrogation records as a method
of supervision and internal control of the patrolmen
under their command. In short, they can have
some indication of which patrolmen are aggressively checking their beats and which ones are
dragging their feet.
Most importantly, records of field stops are
invaluable to police supervisors when a citizen
complains that he was rudely approached or
otherwise mistreated during the course of a field
interrogation. In a large metropolitan police department it would be next to impossible to determine which officers were involved in the complaint unless there was a record of the incident.46
We can only presume that this latter use of records
is what the drafters of the Aul Code had in mind
when they required that rather extensive records
be maintained. This presumption is reinforced
when we notice that there is, among other information to be recorded, information of witnesses
present during the field stops and whether or not
the detained person objected to the stop. It is
also worthy of note that the Am drafters went to
rather elaborate precautions to limit potential
abuse of the field stop, yet did not see fit to require
that the records kept of the field stop be destroyed
after a limited period of time. Under the Ar provisions these records could be maintained indefinitely. The only conclusion which can be drawn
from this circumstance is that the Au drafters did
not consider maintenance of records to be a significant source of unwarranted exercise of police
powers.
It is the author's opinion that field stops should
not be recorded as arrests and should not be considered as "a police record". By "police record"
we mean that an authorized person in a police
position who was checking on a specific individual
would not be routinely informed of any field
stops. Beyond this limitation, the keeping or
nonkeeping of records is largely a false issue. It
46 The Law Of Arrest: Constitutionality Of Detention
And Frisk Acts, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 641, 654 (1964).

would appear that if the lack of records would
make a policy of field interrogation more palatable
to a particular community, records should not be
kept, not for a law enforcement or legal reason,
but from the standpoint of public acceptance and
police department public relations.
TIH

SEARCH

Of the various issues which may arise in the
course of a field interrogation, probably the most
critical and controversial issue is that of a search
of the detained person. This is a vital issue because
a person arrested after a field stop is frequently
arrested for the possession of contraband which is
discovered as a result of a search. In addition, it
is one of the most difficult issues to grapple with.
The overwhelming majority of authorities seem
to approve of the idea of permitting police officers
to make field stops and conduct inquiries. However, there is a much more substantial difference
in opinion when the inquiry includes a search.
One line of reasoning holds fast to the idea that
absolutely no search of a person is constitutionally
permissible unless that search is conducted under
the authority of a search warrant or as an incident
to a lawful arrest." It naturally follows, according
to this rationale, that if a field stop is not an arrest,
then there can be no search of a person until
such time as an arrest has occurred. The dissent
in the case of the People v. Rivera took this position. Justice Fuld predicated his dissent on the
basis that a search without consent and without
a warrant is constitutional only if it is an incident
to a lawful arrest. He brushed aside any suggestions that a frisk is distinguished from a search
by pointing out that neither the Fourth Amendment nor the law of torts distinguishes between
a cursory search and an elaborate one. He then
stated: "This is nothing but exercise in semantics;
9
a search by any other name is still a search".
It is, perhaps, interesting to note that the judge
dissented only on the question of the right of an
officer to search as an incident to a field stop. The
highest court in New York was unanimous in
agreeing that officers had a common-law authority
to stop and question an individual.
Another writer also doubts that a search of any
nature is permissible. He appears to base this
4 See Collings, Toward Workable Rules of Search and
Seizure---An Ainicus Curiae Brief, 50 CAL. L. REv.
421 (1962'.
201 N.E. 2d 32, 35 (N.Y. 1964) (dissenting opinion).
4 201 N.E. 2d at 35.
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conclusion on the fact that arrests without warrants are well known and have been traditionally
used whereas searches without warrants have been
more strictly proscribed. He states that a very
important distinction exists between arrests and
searches, and adds: "Whereas the basic postulate
is that a search without warrant is per se unreasonable and is to be tolerated only in certain circumstances... arrest without warrant is hardly
treated as exceptional".50 And a recently published, comprehensive analysis of street stops also
of search are
expresses doubt that gradations
5
constitutionally permissible. '
In general, a majority of the authorities approving a street stop at all would authorize a
cursory search, "a frisk", for the self-protection
of the police officer. While such a modified search
does not fit neatly into a traditional view of search
and seizure law, it does conform more closely to
the realities of the street. As one author states,
"Hale, Hawkins and Blackstone never saw a 4
inch automatic pistol, but to officers who have, it
does not seem unreasonable to search a person
being questioned who may be armed". 52 A 1964
article points out that 26% of the police officers
killed in the four previous years were making an
arrest or transporting prisoners. Another 18 were
killed investigating reports of suspicious persons,
and 63 were killed interrupting robberies or burglaries, even though the officer did not know, in
all cases, that he was in fact interrupting a crime
in progress."
There appears to be virtually no suggestion
from any responsible source that a police officer
be authorized to make a general evidentiary
search incident to a field interrogation. The Uniform Arrest Act, New York's "Stop and Frisk
Act", and the ALt Proposed Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure all strictly tie the authority
of an officer to make a search of any kind incident
to a field stop to the officer's need for protection.
This same limitation is also contained in the case
law of those states, notably California, which
recognize a police officer's right to stop and question an individual as a part of that state's common
law. Thus far, the author has not been able to find
any state which recognizes a statutory or common51Scurlock, supra n. 36, at 118.
5'Recent Statute, 78 HARv. L. REV. 473, 476-477
(1964). See also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948) and Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699
(1948).
Comment, 39 CAL. L. REv. 96, 109 (1951).
53Ronayne, supra n. 25, at 237.
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law right to stop and question persons, but prohibits the police officer from conducting any
type of search of him.
There is a distinct tendency, however, for the
courts to scrutinize a search with considerably
more care than they review the probable cause to
investigate a stopped person's activity. An excellent example of this is the case of People v.
Rodriguez.M4 In this case a motion to suppress
evidence of policy slips was granted. The policy
slips were uncovered while a police officer was
frisking an individual for weapons. The court
reasoned that a cursory search, or patting down of
the outside clothing to determine whether or not
a person was carrying a weapon would not have
revealed policy slips, hence the court held that this
type of search must, by the very nature of the
evidence uncovered, have been beyond the frisk
which was contemplated under the New York
statute and was an unlawful search.
Another such case is People v. Simon.55 In this
case a police officer saw the defendant and another
person walking in a warehouse district late at night.
The officer stopped and searched the defendant
and, in the course of said search, found a quantity
of marijuana. Defendant was charged with illegal
possession of that drug. The California Supreme
Court set the information aside and released the
defendant. Chief Justice Traynor pointed out that
under California law a search may be before or
after an arrest but probable cause must exist prior
to the search or it is invalid. In this case, the officer
simply stopped the defendant and thoroughly
searched him before he asked defendant to identify
himself or explain his conduct. The Court pointed
out that there is nothing unreasonable in an officer's questioning of a person who is outdoors late
at night. However, in this case the type of search
indicated that the officer was engaged in a general
search for evidence without probable cause, which
is, of course, unlawful. A later California case, also
written by Chief Justice Traynor, does clearly
recognize the right of an officer to request a suspect
to "submit to a superficial search for concealed
weapons"." 6
In summation, the majority of the authorities
which have faced the issue of the search seem to
take the position that even though the constitutional language relating to searches has no exceptions, courts, in the light of experience, have en4 262 N.Y.S. 2d 859 (Cty. Ct. 1965).
55290 P. 2d 531 (Cal. 1955).
16People v. Mickelson, 380 P. 2d 658 (Cal. 1963).
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grafted certain exceptions such as a search incident
7
to an arrest or a search by consent.5 These authorities tend to engage in a balancing of social
values and reach the conclusion that, "...as long
as the frisk is strictly limited, this invasion seems
outaeighed by the necessity to protect the questioning policeman".
This general rationale is also well summarized in
the commentary to the stop and frisk provision of
the ALl Iodel Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure:
... an officer, if he reasonably believes his
safety so requires, may search a person
stopped pursuant to this section. He may
search only to the extent necessary to discover any dangerous weapon which may on
that occasion be used against him. The
search envisioned here should not usually be
more intensive than "an external feeling of
the clothing" that is, the traditional "frisk".
The subsection also authorizes a search of the
immediate surroundings of the person for the
same purpose and under the same limitations.
By immediate surroundings, the draft intends
to designate any place (for example, a lady's
handbag) where a weapon may be concealed,
and which during the interview remains in
easy reach of the person.
The Reporters included this authority to
search with some reluctance. Many people
would find being subjected even to the limited
search authorized by this subsection offensive
and humiliating. Nevertheless, the important purpose which this section as a whole is
intended to serve would be frustrated if no
search were authorized. Police officers will not,
and should not, be asked to risk an encounter
with a person who may be armed unless they
can protect themselves by "frisking" the
person at the outset. Where the authority to
stop has been recognized, the search for dangerous weapons has also generally been recognized as a necessary concomitant to it.
The draft seeks to minimize as far as possible the recourse to such searches by limiting
their scope to the specific need which is their
justification. The very extensive search which
may accompany an arrest is clearly not within
the terms of this provision."1
Leagre, supra n. 17, at 339.
5Recent Statute, 78 HARv. L. REv. 473, 476-77
(1964).
9 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE,
Tentalire Draft No. 1 (March 1, 1966), 101.
s7

Thus far, we have discussed a number of authorities which take the position (a) that no
search at all is permissible under any circumstances
which constitute less than probable cause to make
an arrest, and (b) that some type of limited search,
for the protection of the officer involved, is permissible. A third alternative has been suggested.
It would authorize police officers to conduct a
limited search for deadly weapons and would go
further by not permitting into evidence any item
recovered by the search except weapons. Presumably the reasoning behind such a suggestion is that
the authority of a police officer to frisk an individual for deadly weapons would not be abused by
being used as an excuse to conduct a general search
of the detained person for other types of contraband. In other words, it would remove any motive
for the officer to conduct a thorough search for
items other than weapons since the other items
could not be used in obtaining a conviction.
At first blush such a proposal sounds rather
attractive. It would allow the officer to protect
himself and greatly reduce the temptation to abuse
the authority to frisk. However, such a proposal,
like most simplistic solutions to extremely complex
problems, can lead to some illogical situations. In
general, if this proposal were followed we may
encounter a situation of a police officer making a
perfectly proper frisk and uncovering what could
very well be evidence of a major crime, but immunity would be accorded the stopped person because the seized evidence was not an instrumentality dangerous to the officer. Indeed, we could easily
reach the point where a police officer would not
stop persons whom the officer suspects are gnilty
of possesing narcotics, burglary tools, stolen property or other contraband out of fear that he might
accidently find some of this contraband on the
person during the frisk and thereby taint its
validity. This possibility is not merely a product
of the author's imagination. In fact, one case now
pending before the Supreme Court involving New
York's "Stop and Frisk Act" is just such an example.
The question naturally arises: If there is so
little judicial or scholarly opposition to the authority of a police officer to stop an individual and
ask an explanation of his movements, why do we
then find a rather significant opposition to the
right of a law enforcement officer to conduct a
frisk as an incident to the street stop? It is this
author's opinion that some of the concern relating
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to a frisk is based on the very real potential for
abuse in a field situation.
To begin with, most openminded students of
the problems related to field interrogation can
easily see the distinction between a field stop and
arrest. There is a relatively clear distinction between a four or five minute conversation with a
policeman on a street corner, as in the case of a
field stop, and, on the other hand, an arrest in
which the individual is taken to a police station,
charged with a crime, fingerprinted, "mugged",
and in general caught up in the entire criminal law
process. However, the distinction between a frisk
and a more thorough search is an even finer distinction than that between a field stop and an
arrest. It is quite easy to define a frisk as the
patting down of the outer clothing for the purpose
of determining by touch the existence of a concealed weapon. However, in actual field practice,
a police officer will frequently face situations in
which a simple "frisk", to be effective for selfprotection, may turn into a reasonably thorough
search--even assuming the good faith of the police
officer. For example, cold weather, when people
are wearing numerous garments and heavy clothing, creates something of a problem. Even the
educated fingers of a veteran police officer have
difficulty in checking for knives and small weapons
beneath extremely bulky clothing. Requiring an
individual to unbutton his topcoat and perhaps a
jacket underneath the topcoat, then checking the
various layers of clothing for a reasonably available
weapon can have all the appearances of a rather
thorough search. Such a search is certainly necessary to protect the officer in some instances, but
it also goes considerably beyond the mere patting
down of the outer clothing as discussed by the
courts. Hatbands, boot tops, and collar linings are
favorite places for concealment of certain types of
sharp bladed weapons, yet it is extremely difficult
to check these parts of a person's clothing by
simply running a hand over them, and this is especially true if the weapon is made of flexible
material such as leather or plastic, or a safety razor.
The most common confiscated weapon which the
author has seen in two years' field experience with
police departments is a small Spanish or Italian
automatic pistol, which sells for $8-15 and which
fits in an adult male's hand without being seen.
Such weapons, while lacking in accuracy and precision, are extremely effective at point-blank
range. Yet this is the type of weapon which an
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officer is supposed to protect himself against by
patting down the outer clothing.
In addition to the sophistication and increasing
availability of commercial weapons, the officer in
the street must contend with an occasional ingenious homemade weapon. The author has seen
a homemade "zip gun" capable of firing a single
.22 or .25 caliber bullet which was designed and
constructed to be concealed in a common cigarette
lighter. From outward appearances, this weapon
would have a very low threshold of reliability and
accuracy but it did work when tested. Therefore,
in the hands of a certain type of person, the very
act of casually lighting a cigarette could spell death
or serious injury to a police officer.
Another troublesome problem in defining the
limits of a frisk is the question of items being
carried by the detained individual. There is a very
real threat to officers making street stops under
certain circumstances when the detained individual
is carrying open boxes, grocery sacks or even handbags. This is an especially relevant problem in view
of the fact that the carrying of some such items very
late at night and in certain portions of a city would
be the very type of circumstance which would
attract a police officer's attention to the individual
in the first place.
The purpose of the preceding discussion is not
to develop any definite line between a frisk and a
search. Rather, the purpose is to demonstrate that
a peace officer, in order to protect himself, is going
to have to engage in some type of search which will
exceed the casual patting down of the outer clothing. In balancing the degree of intrusion of the
freedom of personal movement over and against
the effectiveness of a law enforcement technique,
we must not delude ourselves into believing that
the degree of intrusion, insofar as the frisk is concerned, can be effectively limited to a fleeting
three or four second patting down of outer clothing.
There is still an additional reason why the frisk
of the person causes more concern than the original
stopping of the individual. The statutory and
common-law authority of a police officer to stop
an individual on the street is based on "reasonable
suspicion" that the individual stopped has commited, is about to commit, or is going to commit a
crime. While it is conceded that the term "reasonable suspicion" has not been the subject of extensive case law, nevertheless a reading of the few
cases which have interpreted and analyzed this
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and similar terms indicates that the appellate
courts have some general concept of what these
terms mean and the circumstances to which they
apply. In general these terms mean that a person
must be engaged in some type of conduct or be in
some circumstances which remove him from the
general class of ordinary citizens in the same area
at the same time and, further, that these circumstances must suggest to a reasonably prudent officer that the individual is engaged, or is about to
engage, in some illegal act. While such a criterion
is necessarily vague, it would appear that it is no
more vague or incapable of review than the classic concept of "probable cause to arrest".
It should be noticed, however, that the statutory
authority for an officer to make a frisk as an incident to a street stop is dependent on the officer's
"reasonable belief that he is in danger". Yet research has not revealed a single case in which the
officer's "belief that he is in danger" was ever subjected to appellate review. This presumably means
that the authority of an officer to frisk an individual, which can be a much more serious intrusion of
the individual's liberty than the original stop, is
going to be based on the criterion of whether or not
the officer has a right to stop the individual. It
is understandable that a judge would be somewhat hesitant to review the officer's judgment
as to whether or not he was in danger. After
all, it is the police officer's life which is at
stake and a judge would be naturally hesitant to
review this highly personal decision. But if the
authority of an officer to make a frisk is to be
constitutionally upheld and properly applied and
opposition to the frisk abated somewhat, the courts
are going to have to grapple with the question of
standards which justify a frisk.
The concept of "reasonable belief of danger" is
going to have to be determined and developed by
case law in conformance with our common law
tradition. But it appears that the very first question which must be decided prior to the development of case law is whether or not the courts are
going to require objective criteria or take into account generally surrounding circumstances which
do not necessarily apply to a specific individual
being stopped. In other words, does an officer have
to testify to certain movements or conduct on the
part of the specific individual stopped in order to
justify a belief in danger, or will the court take into
consideration the general character of the neighborhood, the time of day, the availability of assistance

to the officer, the general type of crime which the
detained person is suspected of committing and
other circumstances of a like nature? The author
believes that general circumstances such as those
mentioned must be taken into account in determining "reasonable belief of danger". Any attempt to
require some suspicious movement--such as the
reaching for a glove compartment or a hip pocket
on the part of the individual detained-would not
comport with the reality of the streets.
At this point, we should realistically face the fact
that we are actually not talking about the protection of citizens from the intrusion of a frisk but are
discussing admissibility of evidence. There is not
the slightest doubt that an officer who believes
that he may be in danger, based on any conceivable
criteria, is going to conduct a frisk. If the officer
feels his life is at stake he will protect himself first
and the question of admissibility of evidence will
have extremely low priority. However, the judicial
development of some case law, at least to the extent of crystalizing the concept of "reasonable
belief of danger", will reassure those individuals
who may have reservations about granting a police
officer the authority to conduct a frisk. At least it
will indicate that the.criteria to conduct the frisk
will be subject to judicial review and not left to
the whim of each individual police officer.
There is one final reason why some persons might
have reservations about authorizing a frisk as
opposed to authorizing a field stop. This involves
the question of the detained person's reputation
or embarrassment. It is relatively easy for a welltrained police officer to conduct a short field stop
involving a short period of questioning of an individual and make such a practice inconspicuous
to the other persons in the vicinity. However, a
frisk is more difficult to conceal from other citizens,
especially when it also includes checking of shopping bags or the more heavy-handed frisk necessary for heavy or bulky clothing. Associated with
the question of reputation is the attitude of the
person who has been stopped. The field research for
this article, as well as the author's experience in
the field, has been that individuals who are merely
questioned almost never raise objections to being
stopped, especially if the interrogating officer's
demeanor is one of politeness and efficiency. Almost every objection of any degree observed has
been in a situation where the detained person was
subjected to a frisk. Indeed, this author's personal
experiences while residing in the City of Chicago
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bear out the field observation. He was subjected
to a field stop by Chicago police officers on two
occasions. During both incidents it was quite
understandable that his conduct, when viewed by
a police officer from a distance of a block or so
away, could be considered suspicious. Under both
circumstances, a short explanation of that conduct
satisfied the officers that the seemingly suspicious
conduct was, in fact, reasonable and innocuous.
The author departed from both field stops with a
generally favorable impression of the officers concerned, especially their politeness and alertness.
However, if the field stop had resulted in a frisk of
either the person or an automobile, the author
strongly suspects his own feelings would have been
less favorable and some degree of resentment would
have been present.
A corollary to the question of reputation is the
fact that a frisk is much more subject to abuse by
police officers than a field stop. Assuming that a
police officer desires to harass a particular individual and this harassment took the form of stopping
the individual at every conceivable opportunity,
it would no doubt be annoying and somewhat damaging to the individual's standing and reputation
in his community. However, if the harassment took
the form of a thorough frisk, it could become extremely oppressive, especially if the officer managed to conduct the frisk in open view and in relatively crowded public places. This type of harassment by conducting frequent personal searches is
not a figment of some civil libertarian's overactive
imagination. It exists today, in varying degrees,
to the extent that a slang expression has been developed to cover the situation. Harassment by
frequent personal stops and searches is known in
one big city as "jacking-up" an individual. This
practice of "jacking-up" a citizen is usually accomplished by means of unlawful detentions
and searches. Any statutory or common-law
scheme to add new tools to the arsenal of law enforcement officers must be especially constructed
to assure that it does not, at the same time, legalize
a presently existing abuse.
MIRANDA AND THE FIELD INTERROGATION

One of the more pressing constitutional problems
involved in the area of field interrogation is the
question of what effect, if any, the recent decision
of the Supreme Court in Mirandahas on field stops.
There is an assumption, which is probably valid,
that the requirement that a person be warned of
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his right to silence, that any statement he makes
may be used against him, that he is entitled to an
attorney either of his own selection or appointed
for him if he cannot afford one, would hamper the
use of the field stop as a technique to uncover crime.
Certainly, an exercise of the full Miranda ritual
would have a tendency to alarm a citizen whose
suspicious conduct resulted from completely and
innocuous motives. It is the judgment of the author
that Miranda does not apply to the typical field
interrogation. However, this case has such importance and potentially far-reaching effect on the
process of criminal investigation that it will be
discussed separately and in some detail, apart from
other constitutional issues.
To begin with, all four of the cases which were
decided by the Supreme Court in the Miranda
opinion involved persons who had been arrested
and taken to the police station and interrogated for
the purpose of obtaining a confession. 60 In each of
the cases, a confession was obtained after lengthy
detention and interrogation at the station house.
Before examining the language of the court, it is of
interest to note that Mr. Chief Justice Warren,
who wrote the majority opinion, does not use the
word "arrest" in the opinion. He therefore avoids
the semantic and definitional difficulty which has
been the stumbling block of many other courts and
which was discussed at the very outset of this
article. Instead of using the word "arrest" the
majority almost always uses the word "custody".
Therefore, for our purposes, it behooves us to examine some of the language of the majority opinion
to determine whether or not an interference with a
person's freedom to move about the streets for the
purpose of inquiring of the individual his name,
address, and explanation of actions is the type of
"custody" to which Miranda is addressed.
In the very first paragraph of the majority's
opinion, we find the statement ".

.

. we deal with

the admissibility of statements obtained from an
individual who is subjected to custodial police
interrogation..." 61 The Court then points out
that in each of the cases before it law enforcement
officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him at the police station. By way of introduction to the rationale of the majority's opinion,
Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated:
Our holding will be spelled out with some
specificity in the pages which follow but briefly
60384 U.S. at 443.
61384 U.S. at 439.
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reports of physical abuse of prisoners in order to
obtain confessions, primarily the Wickersham report of 1931 and three Law Review articles dated
1930, 1932 and 1936. The Court then points out
that "Interrogations still take place in privacy".
and that "Privacy results in secrecy and this in
turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what
in fact goes on in the interrogation room." 66 The
Court next discusses at some length two well known
and widely used manuals of police interrogation
wherein the authors discuss psychological techniques of gaining the confidence of the suspect and
It is submitted that the word "custody" means obtaining a confession thereby. The Court then
that an individual has been taken physically from states: "Even without employing brutality, the
the street or other place and confined. This inter- 'third degree' or the specific stratagems described
pretation of the word "custody" is reinforced by above, the very fact of custodial interrogation
additional quotations which will follow. But the exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades
Court also indicated that the Miranda rule would on the weakness of the individuals."
The mahave to be followed in any other situation which de- jority also observed: "'It is obvious that such an
prived a person of his freedom of action "in any interrogation environment is created for no purpose
significant way." At this point in the opinion it is other than to subject the individual to the will of
not clear what the Court means by being deprived
his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own
of freedom of action in any significant way. This badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not
statement implies that Mfiranda is applicable to physical intimidati3n, but it is equally destructive
situations in which the suspect is not actually con- to human dignity. The current practice of inlcomfined in a police station or jail, but, by the same inunicado interrogationis at odds with one or our
token, it also implies that there can be a depriva- nation's most cherished principles-that the intion of freedom of action in an insignificant way, dividual may not be impelled to incriminate himto which Miranda would not apply. As the opinion self." IsThe Court at a later point states: "We
progresses we find the following:
have concluded that without proper safeguards the
process of in-custody interrogation of persons susThe Constitutional issue we decide in each
pected or accused of a crime contains inherently
of these cases is the admissibility of statements
compelling pressures which work to undermine the
obtained from a defendant questioned while in
individual's will to resist and to compel him to
custody and deprived of his freedom of action.
speak where he would not otherwise do so
In each, the defendant was questioned by
freely." 69
police officers, detectives, by a prosecuting
As the opinion progresses, its application to field
attorney in a room in which he was cut off from
interrogation based on reasonable suspicion bethe outside world.6
comes less certain. We find a statement to the
The Court then observed that all four cases were effect that, "the principles announced today deal
similar in that "They all thus share salient fea- with the protection which must be given to the
tures--incommunicado interrogation of indiriduals privilege against self-incrimination when the inin a police dominated atmosphere, resulting in self- dividual is first subjected to police interrogation
incriminating statements without full warnings of while in custody at the station or otherwise de64
constitutional rights". The Court added that prived of his freedom of action in any way". 70
"An understanding of the nature and setting of The preceding quotation very clearly supports the
this in-custody interrogation is essential to our
61384 U.S. at 448.
decisions today". 65
1,384 U.S. at 455-56.
18384 U.S. at 457-58.
At this point the Court goes into a discussion of
69384 U.S. at 467.
70The quotation in the text came from an advance
62384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added.)
sheet, 16 L.Ed.2d 725, No. 7 July 6, 1966. However,
63384 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added.)
the official report inserts the work "significant" between
64Id. (emphasis added.)
the words "an-", and "way", 384 U.S. at 477.
65 Id.
stated it is this: the prosecution may not use
.-tatements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory. stemming from custodial interrogation
of the.defendant unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning init;ated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedont of action in any significant way . 2
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earlier implication that the word "custody" means
confinement at a police station but instead of talking in terms of deprivation of freedom of action in
any significant way which the court discussed early
in the opinion, we now find the opinion turning
to the deprivation of freedom of action in any way.
Of course, if this preceding statement is interpreted
to be the holding of the court in Miranda,certainly
the field stop is a deprivation of freedom of action
"in any way". If this apparent contradiction in the
opinion were not enough, in the very next paragraph we find the court saying that "investigation
[of a crime] may include inquiry of persons not
under restraint". And then the court said:
General on-the-scene questioning as to facts
surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process
is not affected by our holding. It is an act of
responsible citizenship for individuals to give
whatever information they may have to aid in
law enforcement. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of
in-custody interrogation is not necessarily
7

present.

1

The preceding quotation could easily be interpreted as applying to witnesses only and not
to a person who is suspected of committing a
crime. However, such an interpretation is weakened because the Court attaches a footnote at
the end of the foregoing quotation. This footnote
cites with approval the police practice of visiting
"....

the house or place of business of a suspect

and there questioning him, probably in the presence of a relative or friend." 7
It is submitted that this latter quotation rather
effectively destroys the idea that the general
non-custodial investigation of crime referred to
in the Miranda quotation applies only to witnesses.
Based on the preceding quotations, it is the author's conclusion that Miranda was striking at
what the Court considered the inherently coercive
circumstances and atmosphere of a place of confinement and does not apply to general inquiries
made in public places and in public view which
do not have the attributes of a jail or station
house. Miranda, therefore, does not apply to
the typical field interrogation.
There are situations, of course, which could
develop in the field which would bring about an
71384 U.S. at 477-78.
2 3 84 U.S. at 478, n. 46.
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atmosphere and circumstances similar to a station
house questioning and in which Miranda would
apply. For example, a person is stopped and a
general field interrogation, or the evidence obtained as a result of a frisk, indicates that the
detained person has been guilty of a major crime.
If he is placed in a police car and interrogated
at significant length by police officers with relation to the individual's guilt of the crime, the
circumstances would not be significantly different
from the inherently coercive in-custody interrogation which was generally condemned by Miranda.
Then too, a police station is not the only place
where a person can be taken into physical custody
and "cut off from the rest of the world". If a
police officer stops an individual in a store on
suspicion of shoplifting, and takes him to some
isolated room in the back of the store and proceeds
to interrogate him for the purpose of obtaining
a confession, there can be relatively little doubt
that Miranda would apply. Examples such as the
two which have just been mentioned would be
exceedingly rare, however, and to apply Miranda
would have little effect on the general practice
of field interrogation. In summation, the entire
thrust of the rationale of Miranda v. Arizona is
such that it does not apply to field interrogations
so long as the stop is for a relatively short period
of time, is conducted in public, or in a non-police
dominated atmosphere, and the questioning, at
least initially, is confined to the general conduct
of the individual and is not an interrogation
relating to the individual's involvement in a
specific crime for the purpose of obtaining a confession.
FIELD RESEARCH

In order to obtain factual data for this article,
the author made arrangements with the Chicago
Police Department to ride with various units
of that department's Patrol Division in November
and December of 1965, and in April and May of
1966.
Method
The information set forth hereafter in this
article resulted from observation in Task Force
Areas 6, 1, and 4 and in Patrol Districts 11, 2, 20,
and 16. The author would report to the relevant
area or district headquarters at 6:00 P. M. after
a supervisory officer had been notified that an
observer would be present. The author would
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then be assigned to one unit for the night's observation. The officers involved were given an explanation of the purpose of the observer's presence
and were requested to conduct themselves as
though they were on a routine patrol mission.
(The possible effect on the police officers' conduct
due to the presence of the observer is discussed
hereafter.) The author would accompany the
officers during the entire eight-hour shift, making
notes on certain stops which were made. The
data contained herein includes only those contacts in the field which were not primarily concerned with the apprehending of a particular
person for the commission of a specific criminal
act. The type of police activity under investigation in this report is the stopping of individuals
who were allegedly engaged in "suspicious" activity and operates under the various labels such
as "field challenge", "field interrogation", "stop
and frisk", and "stop and quiz".
Explanation of data
The phrase "total persons contacted" represents the number of persons the officer spoke to
in an official capacity. For example, if an automobile with three occupants was stopped and only
the driver was asked to identify himself, one person was counted as "contacted". If all occupants
were questioned or asked to identify themselves,
three persons were counted as "contacted".
The phrase "vehicles stopped" is self-explanatory; it also includes a few instances (less than
ten) when persons were questioned after being
observed in a parked car.
The phrase "frisk of a person or car" means,
in relation to a person, the running of the officer's
hands over the outside of a person's clothing as a
check for concealed weapons. If during the course
of a frisk the officer felt an object which, in his
opinion, could have been a weapon, the incident
is counted as a frisk, even though the officer
went into the person's clothing after feeling the
object. The frisk of a car is defined as a superficial
shining of a flashlight inside the automobile to
observe items which would be in plain view;
it also includes the shining of lights under the
seats and other potential hiding places which are
accessible without rearranging any items in the
car.
The phrase "search of a person or car" is defined,
in relation to an individual, as the examining of
the inside of a person's pockets or minutely examin-

ing a piece of clothing; for example, taking a
person's hat off and turning the sweatband inside
out. Basically, any physical investigation which
extended beyond the feeling of a subject's outer
clothing is counted as a search. The looking inside
of packages or sacks is not counted as a search
unless the officer shifted the contents of the parcel
around or lifted some items of the parcel in order
to examine all of the contents of the package.
Any such rearranging of the contents of a parcel
is counted as a search. A search of an automobile
is defined as any conduct which goes beyond a
superficial checking of the interior of an automobile. The opening of glove compartments,
trunks, or boxes inside a car are examples of
searches. Any time the officer felt it necessary to
rearrange any of the contents of an automobile
it was counted as a search.
The phrase "approval" represents the number
of persons who affirmatively congratulated the
officers for being alert or expressed their appreciation of the officer's presence.
The phrase "Protest 1" represents the number
of persons who did not verbally protest at being
stopped, but who displayed objective signs of
annoyance or inconvenience.
The phrase "Protest 2" represents the number
of persons who were visibly upset at being questioned and expressed such disapproval verbally.
Using the definitions contained above, the data
obtained is as follows:
Total persons contacted, 297;
Vehicles stopped, 129;
Persons arrested, 11;7
Frisk of person or cars, 187;
Search of person or car, 142;
Approval, 4;
Protest 1, 8; and
Protest 2, 7;74
Validity of data
The most difficult problem in this type of field
survey is the interpersonal relationship between
the police officer and the observer. As stated
earlier, each unit was requested to carry out its
function as though the observer was not present.
73Persons arrested: rape, 1; unlawful carrying of
weapon, 5; attempted auto theft, 2; gambling, 1;
theft, 1 and driving while license revoked, 1.
74Ths figure includes one protest, in an ovenhelmingly Negro area, which was primarily directed to the
fact that a white person (the author) was in the area;
the two officers accompanying the author were both
Negroes.
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The author is under no delusion that the request
was complied with entirely. However, even though
the observer is an "outsider" there are some techniques which can be used to minimize the possible
distortive effect of the observer's presence: (A)
The author always rode the entire shift with a
single unit. After a few hours in the close confines
of a patrol car, the officers would begin to become
more accustomed to the observer's presence and
this would, in turn, tend to make the observations
more valid. (B) The normal practice would be to
ride with a different unit each night until the
observer found a team which seemed to be comfortable with him and the observer with them;
then the observer would ride with that unit for
the balance of the time he was in the particular
area or district. (C) The observer attempted to
show by his actions that he knew how to conduct
himself in a field contact situation; the author's
previous experience with another police department in another state tended to relieve the officers' natural apprehension that the observer might
do something foolish in a potentially delicate
situation. (D) In all of the author's relationships
with the officers, he operated on the theory that
establishing a good rapport was his job, thus
taking the burden off the officer to keep the observer "entertained".
Although we must assume that the presence of
a non-policeman had an effect on the conduct of
the officers, it does not automatically follow that
the officers' altered conduct will always reflect
favorably on the police department or the field
contact practice. For example, one night the author accompanied two officers who were so polite
to the public that they actually gave the appearance of being obsequious. It is interesting to note
that almost half of the "Protest 2" incidents
occurred in that one tour of duty. Of course, it is
possible that this was just a coincidence or a
"bad night". On the other hand, it is psychologically valid to state that a grovelling police officer
will get a large share of complaints because he
does not command the respect of the people
with whom he is dealing. In addition, the number
of "searches" was considerably higher than the
author anticipated. Perhaps this resulted from
the officers' attempt to impress the observer
with the very thorough job which they were doing.
There is another reason for believing that the
observer's presence did not seriously distort the
collected data. With the single exception pointed

[Vol. 58

out above, the officers with whom the observer
rode conducted themselves in fundamentally
the same manner. If the presence of an observer
was radically altering police conduct, it follows
that more than three dozen policemen would
have to react to an observer's presence in a uniform manner and would have to keep up the "act"
for more than 300 hours. The author finds such a
suggestion somewhat difficult to accept.
General observations
The average length of time a citizen was detained by a field stop was between two and three
minutes. One person was detained about 20 minutes until the victim of an armed robbery arrived
and made a negative identification. One driver
was detained for more than 45 minutes while a
name check was being made. This delay occurred
on a Friday night while there was a computer
malfunction; the person was arrested when it was
reported that his driver's license had been revoked. Other than these two instances a detention
did not last over five or six minutes and, of course,
the overwhelming majority were much less than
that.
The author was impressed at the length to
which most officers went in order to keep from
drawing attention to the fact that a person was
being questioned. The officers would stand quite
close to the detained individual in order to speak
in low tones. Very few of the frisks or searches
of a person were conducted in the traditional
"hands-on-the-wall" manner. The normal technique used, even for a search, was for an officer
to stand directly in front of the detained individual
and conduct his frisk from this position. The only
movement which the detained person was required
to make was to hold his arms out from his sides
a few inches in order that the officer could feel
under the armpits and the chest pockets. This
technique of frisking is not in accordance with
good police practice and is, in fact, dangerous
to the officer since it places him in a vulnerable
position in the event that the frisked person
decides to attack the officer. 75 Nevertheless, this
kind of frisking technique was almost invariably
used since it can be done in a very inconspicuous
manner by an experienced officer.
The normal technique of a frisk or search of
the person is to require the individual to place
ND SEARCH, 45-55
75 VALLow, PoLicE ARREST
(1962).
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his hands on a vehicle or wall and to extend his
feet out from the object which is supporting his
hands. The only times this frisk was observed
during the course of the author's observation was
in certain situations where more than two persons
were being frisked or where the detained person

gave some distinctly objective sign that he had a
weapon. Examples of this latter category occurred
when an individual would reach under the seat
of his car or would put his hand in his pocket
when the officers identified themselves as policemen and would be hesitant in removing his hand
when ordered to do so.
A number of the officers explained to the observer that the attempts to make the stop as
inconspicuous as possible were done to keep from
drawing a crowd which could potentially create a
problem for the officer on the street. While such a
motive may not be based on the highest principles
of civil liberties, it does minimize the embarrassment factor.
The fact that a field stop, especially accompanied by a frisk or search is humiliating to some
degree, is recognized by a general policy followed
by the officers in the field in Chicago. Males are
almost never subjected to field stops when accompanied by females. The theory behind such a
policy is that a man, either alone or accompanied
by other men, will not normally object to being
stopped and frisked. However, the same man, in
the same circumstances, accompanied by a wife
or girl friend, will feel that his masculine role as a
protector is challenged by such a field stop and
thus he may offer objection or resistance. This
writer observed three instances of field stops
involving females, but in only one instance was a
female involved to the extent that she was listed
under a category of "total persons contacted".
Most of the persons contacted were involved
in some type of "suspicious activity" which was
discernible to the observer. Of course, the term
"suspicious activity" is, to a large extent, a subjective evaluation. And, we must remember, that
the observer was not a trained police officer nor
familiar with the neighborhoods in which he rode.
Of the 297 persons contacted, 243 of them were
engaged in some type of conduct which the author
would classify as "suspicious". Most of the suspicious activity involved attempts, in varying
degrees, to evade police officers as soon as the
individuals recognized a police car, or involved
persons who might be fairly classed as loitering

or lurking in back alleys, dark doorways or similar
locations late at night.
The author did notice that the number of field
stops is a factor in the supervisory control of
patrolmen in the Task Force. This is quite readily
understandable, especially for a unit such as the
Task Force which is given a considerable independence and which does not answer routine calls.
This is not meant to imply that a "quota" system
exists, in the strict sense of the word. Nevertheless, in each Task Force area headquarters a
monthly list is posted in a prominent place on the
bulletin board which indicates, among other
things, the number of field stops which each Task
Force officer has made. In addition, there does
appear to be pressure on the patrolmen to "show
some activity". In areas of a high crime rate and
dense population, this system, insofar as the observer could determine, causes little problems.
However, in some relatively quiet districts this
real or imagined pressure could lead to a number
of field contacts in which there is no suspicion
of any kind. This author also observed, that in
the relatively quiet residential areas, an officer
would patrol for five or six hours without making
any field stops and then, as his tour of duty came
to a close, would stop two or three people within
the course of an hour whose only suspicious activity appeared to be their presence in the neighborhood. Such conduct can only be classified as an
abuse of the field stop technique. It is strongly
suggested that any police department using the
field stop practice should make it scrupulously
clear to the officers involved that stops should
be made only in reasonably suspicious circumstances and that there is not going to be the slightest hint of a "quota" system by which the officers'
efficiency or competence is to be judged.
The data set forth is not intended to be a
definitive study, based on scientific methods, of
the field interrogation practice of the Chicago
Police Department. Rather, the data is descriptive and to some degree subjective even though a
conscious effort was made to obtain a balanced
view of the field interrogation method by selecting
districts and areas of varying crime rates and
ethnic groups. The statistics contained above
indicate that 3.6% of the persons stopped were
eventually arrested, all as a result of information
or physical evidence obtained by virtue of the
detention. Statistics from the Task Force rate
of arrests of "field challenges" indicate that out of
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more than 250,000 field contacts the arrest rate does have some disadvantages. The data indicates
was approximately 3.2%. This close relationship
that approximately 5% of the individuals conbetween the author's sample data and the total tacted show visible signs of anger or resentment
statistics indicate that his experience and observa- at the intrusion. It can be assumed that an untion offer a statistically valid insight into one known number of additional people were more
successful in hiding their feelings about their
police department's experience and practiceespecially if we use the figures contained herein detention. Nevertheless, it is the author's impresas a general guide and do not attempt to use them sion, based on observing the demeanor and manner
of speech of persons detained during the course
as highly precise tools.
The collection of this data naturally gives rise of the field survey, that an overwhelming majority
to the question of whether or not the advantages of the individuals stopped cooperated willingly
of a systematic field interrogation program out- with the police officer, if not out of a sense of civic
weigh its disadvantages. In the final analysis, duty at least with the attitude that this temporary
such a question is based on a person's concept of delay be ended as quickly as possible. The observer
values rather than on some mathematical formula. also noted that all but one of the protests occurred
in predominantly Negro districts of Chicago. It
Nevertheless, we can make some generalizations.
The value of a field interrogation program ex- is likely, therefore, that field interrogation practice.
ceeds the 3.6% of the arrests made because it keeps in all probability, adds to the general deterioration
persons with a criminal inclination on the de- in the relationship between policemen and minority
fensive. Any police department that follows a groups.
practice of centering its attention only on responses
Already noted, the extent of the search in many
to crimes already committed places itself in a instances was surprising. Over one-third of the
position, not of preventing crime, but of reacting field detentions resulted in searches which far
to criminal activity. Such a practice gives the exceeded even that which proponents of "stop and
criminal the initiative in that he is almost totally frisk" advocate. Certainly the searches, except
in two or three instances, went far beyond the type
free to determine the time, place, and circumstance
under which he will commit a crime.76 But a well of search which would be necessary to protect
planned and a well conceived program of field a police officer. Slightly more than one-half of these
interrogation leaves the criminal without all of the extensive searches were made in high crime rate.
options. An aggressive and controlled program Negro areas which had been the scene of large
of patrol to determine who is on the streets, what scale rioting the year before (1964). Most of the
the explanation for their presence is (assuming officers in these districts were quite candid in
the individual is engaged in some unusual activity), explaining that they were aware the search was
will throw an indeterminable variable into any pre- unlawful and that no conviction could be supported
conceived plan to commit a crime. In addition, on the basis of evidence obtained by the search.
such a practice of field interrogation is designed However, they further explained that the purpose
to give the general public, including the vast of these extensive searches was to confiscate
majority of law-abiding citizens, the feeling of firearms in the event of future riots and that a
police .presence". This will in turn, hopefully, conviction for unlawful carrying of a firearm was
help to instill in the general public a confidence largely irrelevant. Such conduct also widens the
in the alertness and efficiency of the police depart- gap between police officers and the Negro minority,
especially in the vicinity of Chicago's Eleventh
ment.
As indicated previously, there was very little District. On the other hand, the officers' prediction
abuse observed in the course of the original stop. of future riots in the summer of 1966 did prove
The data indicates that, on the average, the patrol accurate and the author feels certain that the same
units which were under observation stopped about officers who had to face the rioters felt quite justione person an hour. Considering the general nature fied in previously removing a number of firearms
of criminal activity in the city of Chicago, this from the area of the riots.
number of stops per hour is not excessive.
In general, the "field challenge" practice of
The foregoing data and observations indicate, Chicago's police department has advantages
however, that the field interrogation practice which outweigh the disadvantages. It is submitted,
however, that the number of extensive searches
See BRisTow, supra n. 2.
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is not only unlawful, but unnecessary, and that
such a practice of extensive searching be discontinued or at least not be permitted to hide
under the cloak of legitimate field interrogation
practice. If the Chicago police department decides
to conduct dearly unlawful general searches in
areas of potential rioting, then the department
should, as a matter of policy, do so openly and
explicitly. In this way the courts and the municipal
officials responsible for such a policy can dearly
and cleanly be judged by the responsible citizenry.
To conduct general searches under the guise of
field interrogation does not make the searches
any more lawful, and such a practice endangers,
through abuse, the legitimate use of the tool of
field interrogation.
It is interesting to note that out of the approximately 300 persons subjected to a field stop, not
one single individual indicated in any way that
he would not answer the police officer's question.
The author heard a number of highly unskillful
lies, but observed no one who chose to resort to
silence.

against the home owner for possession of contraband. Once again the courts' exclusionary technique becomes a futility.
Traditional civil suits against police officers
are largely ineffective because of the difficultof satisfying a judgment in a substantial amount
against a relatively impecunious policeman.
As regards remedial action by disciplinary
measures directed at the offending officer, this
seems quite unrealistic to contemplate when consideration is given to the fact that the officer
in our hypothetical case actually obtained highly
incriminating evidence even though his conduct
was illegal. This places the police administrator
in the awkward position, as far as the general
public and his subordinates are concerned, of
disciplining a policeman who caught a criminal.
In addition, a competent defense attorney would
almost certainly get a good deal of mileage at the
trial of the case against the possessor of the contraband out of the fact that the evidence against
him was obtained in a manner so grossly abusive
as to result in a policeman's discharge or suspension.
CONCLUSION
The author's recommendation is that the governIt appears that the primary opposition to author- mental agency by whom the offending officer is
izing temporary police detentions is the fact that employed should be made civilly liable for abuses
such authority is capable of abuse by police officers. in field detention arising out of valice, bad faith,
This fear has some validity and cannot be brushed or gross iteglgence. It is suggested that a field
aside easily. But an effective law enforcement tool detention statute carry with it this creation of
should not be completely negated because it is civil liability against the agency employing the
subject to potential abuse.
police officer.
In dealing with the problem of abuse of auIn order to make civil liability meaningful, it is
thority, it is suggested that attention be directed further suggested that a certain sum of money be
toward the potential abuse rather than the au- assumed as damages in case of such abuse-perthority itself. Thus far the technique of the courts haps a sum in the neighborhood of $500.00, plus
in handling abuse of police authority has been
reasonable attorney's fees. A provision should
through the exclusionary rule which prohibits also be included which would permit the plaintiff
the introduction of illegally seized evidence--a
to collect a higher amount upon proof of actual
technique that, in the main, has been ineffective.
damage. This concept of a minimum is necessary,
It is ineffective because it does not actually pre- however, because in the ordinary situation an
vent the abuse itself but only strikes at a con- individual subjected to police misconduct either
sequence of the abuse. For instance, if police has not suffered any actual damage or else the
officers kick in the door of a person's home in damages which he has suffered are so speculative
the middle of the night and ransack it without as to be extremely difficult to prove. This recommendation is made with the full knowledge that,
probable cause, and if, in fact, the officers find
no incriminating evidence, there can be no doubt initially, at least, this statutory liability would
that a very gross abuse of police authority has result in a rash of ill-founded and even fraudulent
lawsuits.
occurred--and yet there is no evidence to exclude.
The author is confident that a governmental
By the same token, even if some contraband is
found, when the prosecuting attorney learns of agency, faced with the prospect of a budgetthe method by which the evidence was obtained, wrecking series of lawsuits, would very quickly
and very vigorously establish and enforce criteria
there is little likelihood that a charge will be placed
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and standards for field interrogations, and would
also resort to a wide range of administrative sanctions to insure that the criteria are followed. If
this result occurred, the courts would be impelled
to accept the principle that civil rights and liberties
can be adequately protected by police administration without court interference.
It must be emphasized that the civil liability
suggested herein is only for abuses which are
the result of malice, bad faith, or gross negligence.
The fact that a police officer simply made an
error in judgment, would not be the basis for
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liability. In other words, it is contemplated that
no action would lie if unwarranted motives were
absent, as when the officer had legitimate "reasonable suspicion" as a basis for the original stop.
Field detention interrogation is both a constitutional and a necessary tool in the fight against
crime. It must, however, be used with discretion,
and for the legitimate purposes for which it was
intended. The police officer in the street must
take seriously the admonition of the great French
statesman, Talleyrand, when h said, "above all,
not too much zeal".

